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In a recent issue of Public Money & Management,
Ellwood (2014) highlighted the significant
changes to audit and accountability
arrangements for public services in England
(including local government) as a result of the
Local Audit and Accountability Act 2014.
Indeed, since 2010 the UK government has
dismantled and replaced much of the previous
arrangements for accountability and audit in
English local authorities.
This paper analyses the impact of these
reforms on English local authorities in the
context of the UK government’s wider approach
to budgeting and governing in the public sector.
It uses a theatrical metaphor to illustrate how
this approach constitutes three separate ‘acts’,
each of which are separate but nonetheless
need to be considered together in order to
understand the overall arrangement:
•Act 1 is the spending review that sets out a
planning framework for income and
expenditure levels over the medium term as
part of multi-year planning (Ferry and
Eckersley, 2011).
•Act 2 is the annual budget that enables detailed
policy choices with associated financial
impacts and implications (Ferry and
Eckersley, 2012).
•Act 3 constitutes the accountability and audit
arrangements that afford confidence in the
assurance and transparency of external
communication and internal management
practices. These arrangements also provide
reassurance about the competence of those
charged with governance; financial
conformance in the stewardship of public
funds; and enabling performance in service
delivery (Ball, 2012).
In times of uncertainty there may also be a
prologue to the acts in the form of an emergency
budget (Ferry and Eckersley, 2012).
This paper focuses on act 3 of budgeting
and governing—the accountability and audit
arrangements—and concentrates on the local
government context.* In terms of
accountability, the audit has been a traditional
technology to build confidence in stewardship
*In a previous issue of Public Money & Management,
Ellwood and Garcia-Lacalle (2012) discussed the
implications of reforms to these arrangements for
NHS trusts.
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of public funds and value for money (Hopwood,
1984; Power, 1997; 1999; Humphrey et al.,
2011).
Background to local audit and
accountability arrangements in England
In the UK, the New Labour government that
was elected in 1997 introduced an extensive set
of top-down arrangements for accountability
of local government that led to a significant
increase in public auditing. These fitted into
the wider context of comprehensive spending
reviews, which provided multi-year frameworks
for public expenditure between 1998 and 2010.
Within these frameworks the annual budget
was used to assess financial stewardship, but at
the same time spending decisions had to be
linked to outputs and outcomes set out in
public service agreements (PSAs), through
which the Treasury held central government
departments to account in performance terms.
Each department then sought to ensure that its
related agencies, non-departmental public
bodies and local authorities focused their
attention on delivering the objectives set out in
its PSA by setting them specific targets that
(theoretically at least) would help to contribute
towards desirable outcomes.
The Department for Communities and
Local Government introduced various
performance management frameworks—best
value, comprehensive performance assessment
(CPA), and comprehensive area assessment
(CAA)—to monitor English local authorities in
this regard. The Audit Commission, the audit
body for local authorities in England, conducted
annual assessments to determine whether
individual local authorities were delivering
central government objectives, and produced
various reports and scorecards alongside their
judgements (Seal and Ball, 2005; Woods and
Grubnic, 2008; Abu Hasan et al., 2013). Local
authorities were also encouraged to benchmark
with one another in order to share ‘best practice’
and stimulate improvement through a
competitive process—something that most of
them engaged in for reasons of external
accountability (Bowerman et al., 2001).
The hierarchical targeting approach has
endured in some areas—most notably the health
sector—as a means of ensuring that central
policies are implemented. However, the
coalition government dismantled many of the
performance accountability frameworks for
local authorities, including PSAs and CAA,
shortly after taking office in 2010, and also
abolished the Audit Commission that oversaw
the whole system. Government ministers put
forward several reasons for these reforms,
including a belief that the Audit Commission
had ‘lost its way’ by focusing too much on local
government improvement rather than financial
audit, and an assumption that the changes
would save money in a time of austerity
(Ellwood, 2014; Timmins and Gash, 2014). In
addition, ministers espoused a desire to give
councils the freedom to develop their own
performance frameworks as part of its ‘localism’
policy, and promoted the idea of a ‘Big Society’
that could assume responsibility for some of
the functions previously undertaken by the
state. This new approach was illustrated by the
Localism Act 2011, which granted local
authorities a ‘general power of competence’
(and thereby enabled them—for the first time—
to carry out any activity that they consider to be
in the interests of the locality), and also gave
voluntary organizations the right to bid for
greater control over public services (HM
Government, 2011).
The result was that only the spending review
was retained to manage annual budgets,
alongside a financial audit of local government
with some value-for-money studies, which were
overseen by the National Audit Office (NAO).
Although government ministers have devolved
responsibility for operational performance
management to councils, they have maintained
their tight control over local government
finance since the 2010 election. Local authorities
are still heavily dependent on central
government for funding, statutorily required
to deliver a range of public services and have to
agree a balanced budget every year, in spite of
the scale of austerity measures. Indeed, it is
notable that government ministers have asked
authorities to freeze council tax, the only
significant source of revenue over which they
have any theoretical control, in every financial
year since the 2010 election—and any authority
that wishes to increase its council tax by a level
that ministers feel is ‘excessive’ now needs to
finance and organize a local referendum and
gain binding approval for its decision (Ferry et
al., 2015a).
From a top-down accountability perspective
therefore, local government is now assessed on
financial conformance alone—there is no
hierarchical provision for monitoring outputs
or operational performance (Ferry et al., 2015b).
In other words, auditors focus on whether
councils adhere to their statutory requirements
to deliver balanced budgets (local public service
inputs) rather than the extent to which they
deliver high-quality operational outputs or
outcomes. In place of the performance
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monitoring arrangements, the government
introduced a number of bottom-up
accountability mechanisms, ostensibly to give
citizens greater access to information through
data transparency, and thereby help them to
hold local public services to account more
directly. As O’Neill (2006), Eckersley et al. (2014)
and Etzioni (2014) have pointed out, however,
‘transparency’ initiatives of this nature often
reduce accountability because non-expert
citizens are unable or unwilling to analyse the
sheer volume of data at their disposal—and it
may also be difficult to access channels for
complaint and redress.
This paper now briefly reviews the academic
literature on accountability for public sector
budgeting and governing, before considering
the UK government’s accountability and audit
arrangements for local government through
an explanatory study.
Public sector accountability
This paper draws on public administration
aspects of accountability theory in accounting
research to consider budgeting and governing
in central and local government arrangements
in England. It illustrates how central
government has shifted from centralized top-
down accountability arrangements for local
government performance (using the Audit
Commission) towards an ostensibly bottom-up
approach based on data transparency and direct
contact with citizens.
This is important because it has implications
for what data is visible and to whom (Hopwood,
1984) and therefore changes the relationship
between the organization that is being held to
account (the ‘agent’) and the actor on whose
behalf it operates (the ‘principal’) (Mayston,
1993). Notably, however, central government
has retained its hierarchical control over
financial conformance, since local authorities
are still required to deliver statutory services
and set balanced budgets—despite significant
cuts in their funding—and the NAO has taken
on responsibility for this, as well as more
generally assessing value for money in local
public services.
Sinclair (1991) defines public accountability
as ‘a more direct answerability to community’
(p. 222) that involves activities such as answering
to the public concern about how government
programmes are designed, and ensuring that
public money is spent effectively and in
accordance with appropriate governance
safeguards against corruption. In the local
government context, this ‘community’ should
be interpreted as local residents—the
‘principal’—who are served by the ‘agent’ (the
council) in Mayston’s (1993) terms. This
suggests that residents should be given access
to relevant information about their council’s
activity and performance, as well as the
opportunity to initiate changes through the
ballot box if this information indicates poor
performance, financial incompetence or a lack
of effective governance. As such, we can see
how auditing offers potential as a top-down
accountability technology, in terms of governing
economic and social life (Radcliffe, 1999). For
example, Funnell (2011) suggests the auditor
performs a crucial independent role to uphold
trust in public administration.
Nevertheless, some have questioned
whether accountability is too important to be
left to accountants and auditors (Radcliffe, 2008;
Ferry and Eckersley, 2015). Keeping with this,
it has been suggested that data transparency
could lead to a new era of bottom-up
accountability that enables a generation of
‘armchair auditors’ (albeit non-professionalized
and fragmented) to exercise more
comprehensive democratic oversight of public
spending (Pickles, 2011). Indeed, it was only
after the Daily Telegraph began publicizing
details of MPs’ expenses in 2009 that a number
of senior politicians were held to account over
their use of public money, and five
parliamentarians eventually ended up in prison
for abusing the system (BBC, 2013). At the local
level, media organizations and pressure groups,
such as the Taxpayers’ Alliance, have also used
public spending data to raise questions about
how public bodies are allocating their resources
(see, for example, Sinclair and Taylor, 2008).
Accountability and new public management
In recent decades, the UK government has
relied on new public management (NPM) ideas
for shaping public service policies and
programmes in improving delivery (Hood,
1991; 1995). These include marketization,
privatization and the private finance initiative
(PFI)/public–private partnerships (PPPs), which
were undertaken in the name of greater
efficiency, value for money and accountability
(Hopwood, 1984; Sinclair, 1991; Lapsley, 1999;
Broadbent and Guthrie, 2008; Shaoul et al.,
2012). Although most scholars agree with the
objectives of these reforms (Broadbent and
Guthrie, 1992; Lapsley, 1999), they have
questioned the extent to which they have been
achieved (Broadbent et al., 2003a; 2003b) and
highlighted how democratic accountability is
reduced when state officials have less direct
control over public services (Pollitt, 1986;
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Funnell, 2000; Letza and Smallman, 2001).
Indeed, Lapsley (2009) specifically targeted
NPM for its shortcomings, questioning the
applicability of private sector performance
criteria for the public sector and arguing that
the agenda has failed to deliver its proposed
benefits. In particular, he argues that it has
resulted in an entrenched ‘audit society’, which
may mean organizations become too focused
on compliance and devote their resources to
those activities that can be measured—to the
detriment of other priorities. Tragically, these
fears proved to be well-founded in the case of
the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust,
where managers focused overwhelmingly on
meeting central targets to help their hospital
achieve NHS foundation status and patient
care was severely neglected as a result (Francis,
2013).
An underlying issue is also the difficulty of
protecting the public interest when public goods
and services are delivered by a third party
(Broadbent et al., 2003a; 2003b). Contracts
have been used to formalize third party roles in
public service delivery (Hood, 1995; Lapsley,
1999; Broadbent et al., 2003b), and they
represent the government’s legal right to ensure
public accountability is not compromised.
However, the complexity of many public
contracts, as well as their extremely lengthy
time-frames, gives incumbent providers a major
advantage over any potential challengers
(Broadbent et al., 2003a; 2003b; Demirag and
Khadaroo, 2008) and exacerbates the lack of
democratic accountability (Pollitt, 1986).
These issues of accountability theory are
considered next in the context of recent
announcements on arrangements for national
budgeting and governing in the UK that have
implications for local government in England.
Analysis
Acts 1 and 2: The spending review and budget
In June 2010, the Chancellor of the Exchequer
gave an ‘emergency’ budget speech only six
weeks after the coalition government came to
power. This was the prologue of what was to
come concerning the nature and level of public
debt, and associated need for deficit reduction
through initial spending cuts and tax increases
(HM Treasury, 2010a).
Following on from this emergency budget,
the October 2010 spending review provided a
framework for reducing public expenditure
levels between 2011/12 and 2014/15. In terms
of austerity management, the spending review
set out the longest prolonged reductions in
public spending since the 1920s (HM Treasury,
2010b; Ferry and Eckersley, 2011; 2012) and
was the UK’s first attempt at multi-year financial
planning in a time of austerity. This is a difficult
undertaking, since revenue streams from
taxation are uncertain and spending plans
therefore need to be flexible, and there is an
overriding requirement to reduce the public
deficit (Hood, 2010; Pollitt, 2010).
Subsequent annual budgets need to be
considered in the context of this spending
review, which set out a framework of rules for
financial decision-making in forthcoming years.
In addition, the government was reluctant to
further upset the financial markets by
announcing major changes to fiscal policy.
However, the spending review was sufficiently
flexible to allow budgets to respond to emerging
developments, such as slower than expected
economic growth, and initiate changes to try
and address these issues (Ferry and Eckersley,
2012). Throughout this period, however, the
government’s overwhelming priority has been
to reduce the size of the public deficit.
Act 3: Accountability arrangements
Any changes to the relationship between the
spending review, annual budget and associated
arrangements would have implications for
accountability in English local government,
partly because they could alter the scope of
activities that should be incorporated into any
accountability exercise or process. For example,
if the prime aim of the government is to reduce
expenditure, the extent to which public bodies
(including local government) have been able to
keep within reduced budgets should also be
the overriding focus of any audit exercise.
Traditionally, and more so since the
formation of the NAO in 1983, accountability
in the UK public sector has focused on financial
conformance as a minimum, through an annual
financial audit of Whitehall departments that is
supplemented by value-for-money studies
(Dewar, 1991). Until the 2010 election, the
approach became progressively more
centralized with further top-down pressures,
and focused increasingly on operational
performance alongside financial conformance.
For example, under the New Labour
government this was expressed in the form of
spending reviews for multi-year planning,
within which annual budgets had to be set
(Ferry and Eckersley, 2011; 2012); PSAs that
linked funding to department outputs and
outcomes; and departmental capability reviews
that assessed management competence for
delivery.
In particular, the creation and use of PSAs
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in the context of resource allocation was a
key part of each of the New Labour
government’s comprehensive spending
reviews. These PSAs were cascaded down
from Whitehall to the relevant ‘delivery’
organizations, such as local government, in
the form of specific objectives that would
contribute to the overall aims of the parent
department. For example, both the CPA and
CAA frameworks required English local
authorities to report on their progress against
a range of indicators that (theoretically at
least) monitored how well they were
delivering outcomes on behalf of central
government. The Audit Commission carried
out these very detailed assessments and
judged the performance of local authorities
against these targets on an annual basis.
Post 2010: declining local accountability
On taking office, the coalition government’s
rhetoric of localism and the Big Society
suggested that they wanted less of a top-down
approach to performance management (DCLG,
2010), and devolving the ability to develop
their own frameworks chimes with Sinclair’s
(1991) idea that councils should be more
answerable to their communities. In addition,
the climate of austerity meant that incoming
government ministers were keen to transfer
responsibility for deciding on financial cutbacks
to the local level, as well as reduce the cost of
performance monitoring systems (Ferry and
Eckersley, 2011; Lowndes and Pratchett, 2012;
Timmins and Gash, 2014). The October 2010
spending review and March 2011 budget
provided potential technologies to do so,
although not without significant risks, by
allowing the government to reduce spending
on the audit and accountability structures that
were previously in place for local authorities,
and encourage a new bottom-up approach to
develop. It therefore retained the spending
review (and its associated departmental
expenditure limits) and the annual budget that
concentrates on financial conformance, but set
about dismantling much of the architecture
(including the Audit Commission and CAA)
that had assessed in much detail whether local
government delivered desired outcomes.
Although the Audit Commission’s responsibility
for overseeing local authority financial audits
was transferred to the NAO (and the NAO has
also taken on the role of undertaking high-
level value-for-money assessments of local
public bodies), its hierarchical detailed
performance monitoring function simply
disappeared.
To replace these structures, the government
introduced a number of reforms to stimulate
accountability from the bottom-up, in keeping
with its rhetoric of ‘localism’ and the Big Society.
Most notably, its drive for increasing the
‘transparency’ of public administration, which
builds on the Freedom of Information Act
2000 and previous ‘open government’
initiatives, has resulted in the publication of
vast amounts of data relating to public bodies.
Ministers stressed the importance of giving
private citizens, or ‘armchair auditors’, access
to information about how their taxes were
being spent (Pickles, 2011). For example, every
central government department is now
required to publish details of tenders or
contracts worth over £5,000, and the Treasury’s
mammoth Combined Online Information
System (COINS) database, which lists over 24
million financial transactions involving
government departments, was published online
in June 2010 (Curtis, 2010). In addition, all
local authorities in England have been asked to
publish details of each transaction worth over
£500, as well as the salaries of senior staff and
other lines of data.
Although these initiatives may initially
appear to improve the transparency and
accountability of public bodies, the reality is
very different (Eckersley et al., 2014, Ferry et
al., 2015b). Most obviously, processing and
analysing these huge gigabytes of data will
require significant resources and expertise,
which will be beyond the vast majority of
ordinary citizens (see also O’Neill, 2006;
Etzioni, 2014). As a result, the public will be
less aware of how well their local council is
performing, and therefore less able to hold
local officials to account. Crucially, these
reforms have coincided with the deepest
reductions in public expenditure for nearly
a century. This means that there will be no
expert assessment of how service outputs
may deteriorate due to funding cuts, and
therefore reduces the amount of evidence
that critics of the coalition government’s
austerity policies can use to support their
arguments.
Nevertheless, for now at least, the Local
Audit and Accountability Act 2014 formalized
the end of the Audit Commission for England
and Wales and heralded new audit
arrangements (more akin to a private sector
model) for local authorities. This was initially
promoted by the coalition government as a
way of generating (potential) cost savings, as
well as to deal with political suggestions that
the Audit Commission had lost its way.
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However, such views have been challenged
by preliminary scrutiny from an ad hoc
parliamentary committee in 2013, which
suggested that not only were these changes
unlikely to save any money but they would
also challenge the integrity of the audit system
itself. In particular, the legislation was
criticized for abandoning a key founding
principle of public audit, namely that public
bodies must not be allowed to choose their
own auditors (Ellwood, 2014). More
importantly for the purposes of this paper,
the Act confirmed that future local authority
audits would be overseen centrally by the
NAO and would focus solely on financial
management; the previous national
frameworks to monitor council performance
in detail were not replaced.
Conclusions
This paper has investigated the changing
nature of accountabil ity and audit
arrangements for English local authorities
in the context of national budgeting and
governing in the UK. In particular, it has
considered how the government has changed
accountability practices through reducing
top-down monitoring of outputs and
outcomes, and ostensibly replaced it with a
more bottom-up approach that chimes with
ideas of the Big Society and localism. In
contrast to their decision to devolve
performance monitoring functions,
government ministers have maintained a
top-down approach to overseeing financial
conformance, in that councils are still heavily
reliant on central funding, are required to
set a balanced budget every year and undergo
annual audits that focus solely on financial
competence. In this way, the spending review
and annual budget are still subject to formal
and professional scrutiny through financial
audit.
However, audits no longer assess
performance in terms of what outputs and
outcomes have been achieved, nor the
competence of public bodies in policy and
service delivery. PSAs and departmental
capability reviews previously met this need
for central government, and Audit
Commission-led inspections performed a
similar function for local authorities. Now
that this architecture has been dismantled,
the domain of formal accountability has been
narrowed, so that it focuses on financial
budget aspects.  In place of formal
performance assessments, government
ministers have introduced bottom-up
channels for accountability, facilitated
through the transparency agenda, which
increase the amount of data that are publicly
available. Although government ministers
claim that this will enable citizens to hold
public bodies to account without the need
for intermediaries such as the Audit
Commission, in reality these reforms will
only obscure the negative impact of funding
cuts on public service performance. This is
because these data will be very difficult for
the everyday citizen to process and analyse
(Eckersley et al., 2014), meaning that local
accountability is weaker, rather than
stronger, as a result.
In this context, we support Ellwood’s
argument that the Local Audit and
Accountability Act 2014 has significant
implications for autonomy, governance and
accountability of public services, and we
support her call for a much more robust
debate. Indeed, as reported by Thatcher
(2014), the chair of the Public Accounts
Committee and Labour MP for Barking
Margaret Hodge stressed at the Chartered
Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy’s
(CIPFA) 2014 annual conference that:
We need a commission looking at whether public
audit remains fit for purpose right across the
public sector or whether or not we should think
about the arrangements we have to protect the
taxpayers’ interest.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, political parties
did not respond to the committee’s report by
putting the audit and accountability
arrangements for local public services at the
forefront of their campaigns for the UK’s
May 2015 general election. Regardless of the
outcome of the election, however, councils
will continue to face austerity pressures for
the foreseeable future. This will have a
significant impact on the quality and scope
of local public services and could even mean
that some authorities are unable to fulfil
their statutory duties. Such a development
would probably lead to calls for the return of
a centralized monitoring system to ensure
that local bodies are still providing basic
services to their residents. Therefore,
although the Audit Commission is unlikely
to rise from the ashes in its previous form, it
may well be the case that the next government
feels compelled to create a similar inspection
capacity and capability to respond to public
concerns about the performance of local
services.
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